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QUESTION PRESENTED ON REHEARING
Did the Court overlook the issue of whether the Dishingers are the prevailing
party on appeal for purposes of an award of attorney's fees incurred on appeal?
ARGUMENT
In the opening Brief of Appellants and in the Reply Brief of Appellants, the
Dishingers specifically argued that this Court "should order the trial court to award
the Dishingers their reasonable attorney^ fees at trial and on appeal." Br. of
Appellants 19; Reply Br. of Appellants 17 (emphasis added).
This Court has remanded this case to "the trial court to determine if either
party is entitled to attorney fees as the 'prevailing party' under the lease." Dishinger
v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, 1 40 (copy of opinion attached as an addendum to this
petition). The determination of who is the "prevailing party" at the trial court level
in light of this Court's decision is appropriately made by the trial court. However,
the determination of who is the "prevailing party" on appeal for purposes of an
attorney's fee award is customarily made by the appellate court, and on remand the
trial court is instructed to make a factual finding as to the appropriate amount of such
attorney's fees. See, e.g., Russell v. Thomas, 2000 UT App 82, J 18, 999 P.2d
1244 ("Because plaintiffs were the prevailing party on appeal, we remand to the trial
court for a determination of reasonable costs and attorney fees."); Redevelopment
Agency of Salt Lake City v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112, 1126-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
-1-

("Owners are entitled to reimbursement by Tenants of their attorney fees incurred on
appeal. We remand for purposes of determining the amount of a reasonable attorney
fee."). This Court overlooked the latter principle in remanding the prevailing
party/attorney fee question to the trial court.
The Dishingers prevailed on the issues they appealed to this Court.
The Court's holdings that there was an accord and satisfaction setting the
appropriate rental rate at $19 per square foot, and that the Dishingers were
not in unlawful detainer (Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, 1 40) gave
the Dishingers essentially all the relief they sought on appeal (with the only
other issue being attorney's fees).
In contrast, Ms. Potter only prevailed on one narrow issue that she
presented on appeal, namely that she was entitled to an unspecified amount of
administrative fees.1 Ms. Potter did not prevail on her claim that the "then
prevailing rental rate" was synonymous with "market rate" and that the
1

Ms. Potter's claim for administrative fees arose in the context of the
Dishingers' claim for an accounting at trial. In order to justify the amount of common
area charges that Ms. Potter had previously charged the Dishingers, she included
administrative fees in her accounting for the very first time during the litigation (which
administrative fees had not previously been charged to the Dishingers or other tenants
with similar leases notwithstanding the language in the lease). Accordingly, Ms.
Potter's claim for administrative fees will ultimately offset in part the $8,372.61 (plus
a proportionate share of a property tax refund) which was awarded to the Dishingers at
trial as the amount that Ms. Potter had overcharged the Dishingers for common area
charges (R. 606). The amount of the claimed administrative fees applicable to the
accounting period addressed at trial is $1,873.93. See Ms. Potter's Memorandum in
Support of Defendant's Proposed Judgment, filed January 27, 1998, at p. 3 (R. 385).
-2-

appropriate rental rate should be $30 per square foot. Ms. Potter did not
prevail on her claim for late charges either.
Accordingly, this Court should declare that the Dishingers are the
prevailing party on appeal for purposes of an award of attorney's fees
incurred on appeal. Alternatively, the Court should clarify in its instructions
to the trial court on remand that it has the discretion to determine which party
was the "prevailing party" at trial and on appeal.
CONCLUSION
This Court should amend its opinion to make clear that the Dishingers are the
prevailing party on appeal for purposes of an award of attorney's fees incurred on
appeal, the amount of which to be determined by the trial court on remand.
I hereby certify that this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
Dated this 11th day of July, 2001.
Respectfully submitted,

TESCH, VANCE & MILLER, LLC

^^^^^wayn^/^Vance
<s^
David^B: Thompson

6

Counsel for James and Nancy Dishinger,
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 11, 2001,1 caused two (2) copies of the
foregoing Petition for Rehearing to be mailed, postage prepaid, to Robert M. Felton,
counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant herein, at the following address:
Robert M. Felton
Attorney at Law
39 Exchange Place, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thorne.
BILLINGS, Judge:
fl
plaintiffs James and Nancy Dishinger dba TCBY Yogurt (the
Dishingers) appeal the trial court's judgment finding them in
unlawful detainer. Defendant Jana Potter dba Silver Queen Hotel
(Potter) cross-appeals the trial court's refusal to instruct the
jury on the meaning of "prevailing rate" and its failure to award
her administrative, late, and attorney fees. We reverse and
remand.
BACKGROUND
^2
in May of 1990, Erik Ziskend entered into a commercial lease
with Potter for premises located on Main Street in Park City,
Utah. On May 31, 1994, Ziskend assigned the lease to the
Dishingers. Potter consented to the assignment. The Dishingers
operated a frozen yogurt shop on the premises.

113
The lease provided for continuous three year options after
expiration of the initial three year lease term. Under the terms
of the lease, the Dishingers, as tenants, were required to notify
Potter in writing of their desire to exercise the option 120 days
prior to the expiration of the current lease term. The lease
specified that the rental rate for an option period would be
"adjusted upward, but not less than the current Minimum Monthly
Rent being paid, to the then prevailing rental rate of similar
buildings in the Main Street area of Park City, Utah."1
H4
On February 1, 1996, the Dishingers notified Potter in
writing of their desire to exercise the lease renewal option.
Thereafter, the following correspondence took place. On April 4,
1996, Potter advised the Dishingers that the prevailing rental
rate of similar buildings on Main Street in Park City was $30 per
square foot and thus, pursuant to the lease, $3 0 per square foot
($2,425.00/month) would constitute the new base monthly rent.
The Dishingers responded that, based on the appraisal they had
performed, the prevailing rental rate of similar buildings was
$19 per square foot ($1,535.83/month).
H5
At the commencement of the July 1, 19 96 renewal period,
without an agreement as to what would constitute the base monthly
rent, the Dishingers began paying rent in an amount reflecting
their appraisal of $19 per square foot. They sent Potter a check
for $1,976.92, clearly noting it was for "New Base Rent." On
July 8, 1996, Potter sent the Dishingers a notice of default on
the grounds that the Dishingers were $889.17 delinquent in their
July rental payment. On July 13, 19 96, Potter served the
Dishingers with a notice to pay the remaining rent or quit. On
July 15, 1996, Potter negotiated the Dishinger's July 1 rent
check. On the first of every month, from July 1996 through June
1997, the Dishingers sent Potter a check for $2,137.II2
reflecting $19 per square foot in base monthly rent. Potter
negotiated each of those checks.
H6
On August 8, 1996, the Dishingers filed a declaratory
judgment action asking the trial court to interpret the lease
provision regarding the monthly rental rate. Potter counterclaimed for breach of lease and unlawful detainer.

1. From a review of the record it appears that the Dishingers
were paying $18.48 per square foot in minimum monthly rent at the
time they notified Potter of their desire to exercise the option.
2. The Dishingers subtracted $160.19 from the July 1, 1996
rental payment for remaining credits and premature Consumer Price
Index increases occurring in 1994 and 1995.
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1[7
After a jury trial, the jury returned a special verdict
answering a number of factual questions. In the special verdict
the jury found there was a legitimate dispute as to the "then
prevailing rental rate," that the Dishingers tendered payment to
Potter in full satisfaction of the disputed amount based on their
appraisal of $19, and that Potter accepted the rent payments
after the July 13 notice to quit. The jury also found the "then
prevailing rental rate" to be $25 per square foot, and as such,
Potter was entitled to recover the balance of base rent, totaling
$8,730.
f8
The Dishingers filed a motion for entry of judgment based on
the special verdict, arguing that the jury's special verdict
established an accord and satisfaction, which fixed the base
rental rate at $19 per square foot, and thus, they were current
in monthly payments and Potter's unlawful detainer claim should
be dismissed. The Dishingers also argued that a determination
that they were in unlawful detainer of the premises was precluded
because Potter accepted rental payments after serving the notice
to quit, thus waiving forfeiture of the lease.
i|9
The trial court, first Judge Brian, then Judge Hilder in an
amended judgment, entered judgment for Potter. The trial court
concluded that, based on the findings of the jury in its special
verdict, it was "clear" that while Potter accepted payments after
the notice to quit, the amount received "did not represent a full
payment of base rent," and thus did not constitute an accord and
satisfaction. Thus, the trial court concluded the Dishingers
were in unlawful detainer and entered judgment in favor of Potter
for $8,730, which was trebled to $26,190 pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-36-10 (1996). This appeal followed.
i[lO On appeal, the Dishingers argue the trial court was
precluded from determining they were in unlawful detainer because
the jury's special verdict established an accord and satisfaction
as a matter of law. Alternatively, the Dishingers argue that
Potter affirmed the lease by accepting rent payments, thereby
waiving forfeiture of the lease, and thus precluding a finding of
unlawful detainer.
i|ll Potter cross-appeals, arguing the trial court should have
instructed the jury that the "then prevailing rental rate" meant
market rate. Potter also argues the trial court erred by failing
to award her administrative fees, late fees, and attorney fees as
required by the lease.
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ANALYSIS
I.

Preliminary Issues

^Jl2 In addition to the claims raised in her cross-appeal, Potter
asserts that the Dishingers failed to preserve their claims
below, failed to provide a transcript of the proceedings and
marshal the evidence, and cannot rely on the jury's special
verdict because it was merely advisory. Before addressing the
main substantive issues on appeal, we first address these
threshold arguments.
A.

Preservation of Claims

i]l3 Potter first argues the Dishingers failed to preserve their
claim of accord and satisfaction in accordance with Rule
24(a) (5) (A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule
24(a)(5)(A) provides that "[t]he brief of the appellant shall
contain . . . citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). The
Dishingers reference several places in the record to show that
the issue of accord and satisfaction was preserved in the trial
court.3 Thus, Potter's argument that the Dishingers did not
preserve the issue of accord and satisfaction is without merit.4
3. The Dishinger's citations to the record reference the jury's
special verdict; the Dishinger's motion for entry of judgment
based on special verdict; the Dishinger's memorandum in support
of motion for relief from judgment; and the Dishinger's
supplemental memorandum in support of motion for relief from
judgment. In all these instances the issue of accord and
satisfaction was raised in the trial court.
4. We note the issue of accord and satisfaction was not raised
in the pleadings. However, Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that issues not raised in the pleadings may be
tried by express or implied consent. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b).
"If an issue is fully tried, a court may decide the issue and
deem the pleadings amended even if the issue was not originally
pleaded." Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44,^6 n.2, 19
P.3d 1005 (citing Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) (citation omitted)). "Whether the pleadings may be
deemed amended depends on whether the opposing party had a fair
opportunity to [prepare and meet the issue]." Id. (citing Colman
v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). It must be
evident from the record that the issue has been tried. See id.
(citing Fisher, 907 P.2d at 1176) .
A review of the record reveals that evidence regarding the
(continued...)
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B.

Marshaling the Evidence

1J14 Potter next argues the Dishingers needed to provide a
transcript of the proceedings to allow meaningful review of the
evidence, and have also failed to marshal the evidence. A
transcript of the proceedings is not required because the
Dishingers are relying on the jury's special verdict on appeal,
not the evidence presented at trial. See, e.g., Pugh v. North
Am. Warranty Servs. , Inc., 2000 UT App 121,111, 1 P.3d 570.
Moreover, the marshaling requirement applies only when
challenging findings of fact. See Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App
12,1(24, 973 P. 2d 431. Clearly, the Dishingers are not
challenging findings of fact. Rather, they are challenging the
trial court's application of the law to the jury's special
verdict findings and thus the Dishingers do not have the burden
of marshaling the evidence.
C.

Advisory Jury Verdict

Kl5 Relying on Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, 994 P.2d 193, Potter
next argues that the jury's special verdict was merely advisory,
and therefore the trial court was not bound by the jury's
findings in the special verdict. Potter's reliance on Peirce is
misplaced. In Peirce, the issue before the court was "whether
the jury served in an advisory capacity or whether [the] case was
tried by a jury as a matter of right." Id. at Ul2. However, the
plaintiff in Peirce was seeking an equitable remedy. See id.
"When a jury is used in an equity case, it acts in an advisory
capacity," id. (quoting Romrell v. Zions First Nat'1 Bank, 611
P.2d 392, 394 (Utah 1980) (quotation and citation omitted)),
"'unless both parties have clearly consented to accept a jury
verdict.'" Id. at ^13 (quoting Romrell, 611 P.2d at 394); see
also Utah R. Civ. P. 39(c). Because the parties did not clearly
consent to accept a jury verdict, and the record indicated that
the trial court treated the jury as advisory, the court held that
the jury served only in an advisory capacity and thus afforded no
deference to its findings. See id. at Hl5.
4.
(...continued)
existence of an accord and satisfaction was presented at trial,
and the jury was instructed on and made findings of fact that
would support an accord and satisfaction. Additionally, the
Dishingers argued accord and satisfaction in their motion for
entry of judgment based on special verdict, which Potter had the
opportunity to rebut, and the trial court entered judgment
finding there was no accord and satisfaction. Thus, because
Potter had the opportunity to prepare and meet the issue, we
conclude that the issue of an accord and satisfaction was tried
by implication.

20000081-CA
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Ul6 In the instant case, we are not dealing with an action in
equity. Both the Dishingers and Potter pursued legal claims, the
Dishingers specifically demanded a jury trial on those claims,
and at no time did the trial court inform the parties or the jury
that the jury was merely advisory. Cf. Goldberg v. Jav Timmons &
Assocs. , 896 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah Ct. App. 19.95) (stating, "if
the trial court had intended . . . to use an advisory jury, it
should have notified the parties before the trial began").
Where, as here, the case is tried to a jury as a matter of right,
Rule 49(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the trial
court to "require a jury to return only a special verdict in the
form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact." Utah
R. Civ. P. 49(a). "The [trial] court then applies the law to the
facts as found and renders a verdict." Brigham v. Moon Lake
Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 292, 298, 470 P.2d 393, 397 (1970)
(Ellett, J., further opinion) (commenting on Rule 49(a)).
Hl7

As Justice Ellett explained in Brigham:
The special verdict was devised to relieve
the jury of attempting to apply the law in a
complicated case to the facts in arriving at
a verdict. Instructions to the jury are thus
simplified, and the jurors may, therefore,
concentrate upon the functions which belong
to them, viz., to find the facts in the case.

Id. Thus, "[i]n [the] case of a special verdict, the jury only
finds the facts, and the court applies the law thereto and
renders the verdict." Id. This is what occurred in the instant
case. The trial court instructed the jury: "[I]t is your
exclusive duty to determine the facts in this case, and to
consider and weigh the evidence for that purpose"; "You are the
exclusive judges of the facts and the evidence."
(Emphasis
added.) The trial court then entered judgment, "Based upon the
evidence and the special verdict." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the
jury was not merely advisory. Rather, the jury found the facts
as set forth in its special verdict and the trial court entered
judgment applying the law to those facts.
II.

Accord and Satisfaction

fl8 The Dishingers argue that an accord and satisfaction
occurred prior to trial which set the rental rate at $19 per
square foot thus precluding a finding of unlawful detainer. They
claim the jury's special verdict answers require a legal
determination of accord and satisfaction. Whether the special
verdict established an accord and satisfaction is a question of
law which we review for correctness without any deference to the

20000081-CA
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trial court.
P.2d 254.

See ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4,1(17, 998
A.

Elements of Accord and Satisfaction

1f 19 To establish an accord and satisfaction, three elements must
be present: "(1) an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute
over the amount due; (2) a payment offered as full settlement of
the entire dispute; and (3) an acceptance of the payment as full
settlement of the dispute." Id. at ^20 (citing Marton Remodeling
v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985)).
1.

Bona Fide Dispute Over Amount Due

if20 To satisfy the first element, "There must be a good-faith
disagreement over the amount due under the contract. The disagreement
need not be well-founded, so long as it is in good faith." Estate
Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992) (citing Golden Key Realty,
Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1985); Ashton v. Skeen, 85
Utah 489, 496, 39 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1935)). The jury clearly found
that there was a good faith disagreement over the amount due under
the lease.5 The jury was asked:
5. Although neither party has addressed this issue in their
briefs, we note at the outset that the option provision in the
lease is most likely unenforceable in Utah. It is a wellrecognized principle that, "A condition precedent to the
enforcement of any contract is that there be a meeting of the
minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly
or implicitly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced."
Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321
(Utah 1976) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) . In Pincrree, the
Utah Supreme Court stated,
"a provision for the extension or renewal of
a lease must specify the time the lease is to
extend and the rate to be paid with such a
degree of certainty and definiteness that
nothing is left to future determination. If
it falls short of this requirement, it is not
enforceable."
Id. at 1321 (quoting Slayter v. Pasley, 264 P.2d 444, 446 (Or.
1953) ) .
In the instant case, the lease provided that the rental rate
for the renewal period would be "the then prevailing rental rate
of similar buildings in the Main Street area of Park City." On
July 1, 1996, the commencement of the renewal period, the parties
had yet to agree on what constituted "the then prevailing rental
(continued...)
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Considering all of the evidence in this case,
do you find by a preponderance of the
evidence that a legitimate dispute existed as
to the "then prevailing rental rate of
similar buildings in the Main Street area of
Park City" at the time the [Dishingers] made
monthly rental payments based on $19 per
square foot as satisfaction in full?
To this question the jury answered, "Yes." Thus, the first
element of accord and satisfaction was established by the jury's
special verdict.
2.

Payment Tendered in Full Satisfaction of Dispute

U21 The jury found that the payments tendered by the Dishingers
were made in full satisfaction of the disputed rent. The jury
was asked: "Considering all the evidence in this case, do you
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [Dishingers]
notified [Potter] that these payments were made in full
satisfaction of the disputed rent amount?" The jury answered,
"Yes." Thus, the second element of accord and satisfaction was
established by the jury's special verdict.
3.

Acceptance of Payment as Full Settlement of Dispute

H22 In Estate Landscape, the Utah Supreme Court reasoned that
the third element of accord and satisfaction may be satisfied by
the creditor's subjective intent to discharge an obligation by
assenting to the accord, or conduct which gives rise to a
reasonable inference that acceptance of payment discharged the
obligation. See Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 330.
1J23 In the instant case, the jury found that Potter accepted the
monthly payments made by the Dishingers. The jury was asked:
5.
(...continued)
rate of similar buildings in the Main Street area of Park City."
Both parties had communicated to the other a vastly different
rate and interpretation, and the Dishingers filed a declaratory
judgment action asking the trial court to interpret the
provision. Thus, it cannot be said that the rate provided for in
the option provision of the lease possesses the certainty and
definiteness required to be enforced. In sum, there was no
meeting of the minds, and as a result, no agreement. Therefore,
the lease terminated by its own terms as of July 1, 1996.
However, because we conclude that an accord and satisfaction
occurred, the unenforceability of the option provision does not
affect our analysis.

20000081-CA
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"Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that [Potter] accepted the monthly
rent payments made by the [Dishingers] which are calculated at a
rate of $19 per square foot?" The jury answered, "Yes."
However, the jury did not make a finding that Potter subjectively
intended to assent to the accord. The fact that Potter counterclaimed for breach of the lease and unlawful detainer shows she
did not subjectively intend to assent to the accord. Thus, to
find an accord and satisfaction, we must determine whether
Potter's conduct established the accord and satisfaction as a
matter of law.
H24 In Estate Landscape, the defendant sent the plaintiff a
check for $8,613, and followed it with a letter stating that the
check was "payment in full for satisfaction of contracted
services. If you are not willing to accept that sum, . . . in
full satisfaction of the sums due, DO NOT negotiate the check,
for upon your negotiation of that check, we will treat the matter
as fully paid." Id. at 324-25 (emphasis omitted). The plaintiff
filed suit to recover the $30,162.50 it thought it was owed by
the defendant, then negotiated the $8,613 check, and amended its
complaint to recover the difference. See id. at 325.
1125 The trial court ruled that negotiation of the check did not
constitute an accord and satisfaction. See id. This court
affirmed, over Judge Jackson's dissent, reasoning that the
defendant's letter was "entirely unilateral," and that the
plaintiff's
signature on the check is not an assent to an
accord not found on the face of the check as
a restrictive endorsement, where the party to
whom the accord is offered has expressly
rejected the proposed accord, continued the
dispute, and filed litigation to resolve it
adversarially in court.
Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 793 P.2d 415, 419-20 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(footnote omitted), rev'd, 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992).
1|26 The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and reversed, holding,
"Where, as here, the check is tendered under the condition that
negotiation will constitute full settlement, mere negotiation of
the check constitutes the accord, regardless of the payee's
efforts or intent to negate the condition." Estate Landscape,
844 P.2d at 33 0. Thus, "'[w]hat is said is overridden by what is
done, and assent is imputed as an inference of law.'" Id.
(quoting Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co., 258 N.Y. 168, 179 N.E. 373,
374 (1932)); see also Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607,
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609 (Utah 1985) (holding negotiation of check with restrictive
condition is an accord and satisfaction even though creditor
wrote "not full payment" beneath condition prior to negotiation);
Cove View Excavating & Constr. Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474, 478
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (finding an accord and satisfaction even
though creditor crossed out restrictive condition on check before
negotiation).
1127 In the instant case, the Dishinger's first check noted the
amount thereof was for "New Base Rent." Therefore, because
Potter negotiated the check, which was tendered by the Dishingers
in full satisfaction of the disputed amount of the base monthly
rent, the fact that Potter at the same time brought an action for
breach of lease and unlawful detainer is of no legal
consequence.6 The third and final element of accord and
satisfaction was established by Potter's conduct.
B.

Special Verdict

f2 8 In its special verdict, the jury found: (1) "that a
legitimate dispute existed as to the 'then prevailing rental rate
of similar buildings in the Main Street area of Park City' at the
time the [Dishingers] made monthly rental payments based on $19
per square foot as satisfaction in full;" (2) the Dishingers
"notified [Potter] that [the] payments were made in full
satisfaction of the disputed amount;" and (3) Potter "accepted
the monthly rent payments made by the [Dishingers] . . . at a
rate of $19 per square foot."
^[29 However, the jury also found that the prevailing rental rate
was $25 per square foot, and that Potter was entitled to recover
the "balance of base rent" from the Dishingers, totaling $8,730.
Based on these findings, the trial court entered judgment for
Potter, concluding that no accord and satisfaction existed and
that the Dishingers were in unlawful detainer because the amount
Potter received and accepted each month was less than what the
jury subsequently determined to be the rental rate.

6. In response, Potter attempts to rely on language from Tates,
Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975),
wherein our supreme court stated, "Ordinarily, the payment of
part of a debt does not discharge it . . . . The reason for this
is that in making the part payment, the debtor is doing nothing
more than he is legally obligated to do." IdL. at 1229. This
general statement is true, to the extent that there is no
"dispute or uncertainty as to the amount due." Id. at 1229-30.
In the instant case it is well established that there is a
dispute as to the amount due.

20000081-CA

10

1[3 0 Although it could be argued that the special verdict
supports inconsistent legal theories (accord and satisfaction and
unlawful detainer), the inconsistency is not fatal. The jury was
instructed to answer all factual questions on all legal theories
presented in the special verdict. While the jury's findings
support inconsistent legal claims, a court is not precluded,
under Rule 49(a), from applying the law to those findings and
entering judgment for a party on one theory, as a matter of law,
which precludes judgment on another inconsistent legal theory.
See Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co., 8 Utah 2d 383, 387, 335
P.2d 619, 622 (1959) (holding inconsistent special verdict
answers immaterial under Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a)); see also Tsudek
v. Target Stores, Inc., 414 N.W.2d 466, 469-70 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (finding inconsistent special verdict answers reconcilable
where jury was simply answering all questions submitted based on
the evidence). Thus, as was the case here, if the special
verdict findings support, as a matter of law, an accord and
satisfaction then there cannot be an unlawful detainer.
C.

Effect of Lease Provision

1]31 Potter responds that even if the jury's special verdict
findings support an accord and satisfaction, the lease itself
precludes an accord and satisfaction. Potter relies on the
"Waiver" provision of the lease which states:
The waiver by Landlord of any term, covenant
or condition herein contained shall not be
deemed to be a waiver of such terms, covenant
or condition or any subsequent breach of the
same or any other term, covenant or condition
herein contained. The subsequent acceptance
of rent hereunder by Landlord shall not be
deemed to be a waiver of any preceding
default by Tenant of any term, covenant or
condition of this Lease, other than the
failure of Tenant to pay particular rent also
accepted, regardless of Landlord's knowledge
of such preceding default at the time of the
acceptance of such rent.
(Emphasis added.) Potter asserts that under this lease
provision, "acceptance of partial rent could not constitute an
accord and satisfaction."
1(32 Though not perfectly drafted, the boilerplate language of
this "Waiver" provision is not ambiguous. The relevant portion,
emphasized above, provides that if the Dishingers default on any
term, covenant, or condition of the lease, and thereafter tender
a rental payment to Potter, and Potter accepts, by accepting,
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Potter has not waived the prior defaults. For example, if the
Dishingers install exterior lighting as prohibited by the lease,
the installation, if not cured within thirty days of notice, is a
default. If, thereafter, the Dishingers send Potter a rent check
which Potter accepts, Potter has not waived the Dishinger's
default for the installation. However, if the Dishinger's
default for failure to pay rent, and thereafter tender a rental
payment to Potter, which Potter accepts, Potter thereby waives
the Dishinger's default for failure to pay rent.
f33 What the lease provision does not provide, is that
acceptance of partial rent does not constitute an accord and
satisfaction. In fact, the term "accord and satisfaction" is
conspicuously absent from the face of the lease, and beyond the
"Waiver" provision, Potter fails to point to any language in the
lease that would support her strained construction. Additionally,
and perhaps more importantly, Potter cannot claim that the
initial check tendered by the Dishingers was "partial rent," when
there was never an agreement as to what would actually be the
rental rate. While hindsight suggests that Potter should have
provided for such a situation in the lease, we cannot write such
a provision into the lease for her. See Jones v. ERA Brokers
Consol. , 2000 UT 61,^|l8, 6 P.3d 1129; see also Rio Alaom Corp. v.
Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980); Provo City Corp. v.
Nielsen Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979). Thus, Potter's
argument that the lease prohibits an accord and satisfaction is
not supported by the lease itself.
1134 In sum, the jury's special verdict established as a matter
of law an accord and satisfaction. The trial court erred in not
entering a judgment on the rental rate for the option period in
favor of the Dishingers. We therefore reverse the trial court's
judgment of unlawful detainer and remand for the entry of a
judgment for the Dishingers based on the legal theory of accord
and satisfaction setting the rental rate at $19 per square foot.7
III.

Administrative, Late, and Attorney Fees

1f35 Potter argues that the lease provides that the Dishingers
shall pay administrative, late, and attorney fees. Potter
submitted her claims for administrative and late fees to the
jury. In its special verdict, the jury found that, in addition
to what the Dishingers had already paid to Potter, Potter was
7. Because we conclude there was an accord and satisfaction and
thereby reverse the trial court's legal conclusion that the
Dishingers were in unlawful detainer, we do not address the
Dishinger's alternative argument of waiver and Potter's crossappeal regarding the definition of the term "prevailing rate."
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only entitled to the "Balance of base rent." Based on this
finding, the trial court determined that Potter was not entitled
to administrative and late fees. However, this was properly a
legal not a factual determination. The lease is clear and
unambiguous that Potter was entitled to administrative fees. The
lease states in no uncertain terms that the tenant shall pay for
all costs and fees associated with supervising and administering
to the common areas.8
^36 The Dishingers respond that Potter's argument for
administrative fees was not presented below. However, the trial
court clearly ruled on the issue based on the jury's special
verdict findings. Thus, Potter's claim for administrative fees
was presented below. Therefore, we reverse and remand to the'
trial court for an award of Potter's administrative fees.
1137

The lease further provides:
Tenant shall pay to Landlord a late charge of
ten ($10.00) dollars per day until the amount
due is paid in full. Tenant further agrees
to pay any attorney's fees [sic] incurred by
Landlord by reason of Tenant's failure to pay
rent and/or other charges when due hereunder.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, Potter was only entitled to late fees
and attorney fees under this provision if the Dishingers failed
to pay rent. Because we conclude there was an accord and
satisfaction, the Dishingers were current on their rent payments
and therefore Potter was not entitled to late fees.9
1(38 The trial court determined that Potter was not entitled to
attorney fees because the lease provided that the "prevailing
party shall be entitled to recover" its attorney fees, and while
Potter prevailed on her counter-claim, the Dishingers prevailed
8.

Specifically, the lease states that the tenant shall pay
All costs to supervise and administer said
common areas, used in common by the tenants
or occupants of the building.
[S]aid costs
shall include such fees as may be paid to a
third party in connection with same and shall
in any event include a fee to Landlord to
supervise and administer same in an amount
equal to ten (10%) of the total costs of (i)
above.

9. Potter does not argue she was entitled to attorney fees under
this provision.
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on their claims for an accounting and credit for overcharges of
common area expenses. Thus, the trial court determined neither
party should be awarded attorney fees because both prevailed.
113 9 Because we conclude that there was an accord and
satisfaction and thus no unlawful detainer, the "prevailing
party" issue as to attorney fees should be reconsidered by the
trial court on remand. Therefore, pursuant to the terms of the
lease, Potter is entitled to her administrative fees, and we
remand to have the trial court determine if either party should
be awarded attorney fees as the "prevailing party" under the
lease.
CONCLUSION
1(40 We conclude, based on the jury's special verdict, an accord
and satisfaction occurred as a matter of law fixing the "then
prevailing rental rate" for the option period of the lease at $19
per square foot in base monthly rent. Therefore, because the
Dishingers were in lawful possession of the premises, we reverse
the trial court's legal determination of unlawful detainer and
its award of treble damages. We further conclude that under the
terms of the lease, Potter was entitled to her administrative
fees and remand for the trial court to determine if either party
is entitled to attorney fees as the "prevailing party" under the
lease.

^Judith M. Billings, Judge

H41

I CONCUR:

WilTi^mS? A a fThorne73TT^^udge
rne, JrTT^kid

ORME, Judge (dissenting):
^[42 I cannot agree there was an accord and satisfaction in this
case. While there was a bona fide dispute over the new rental
rate and the Dishingers may well have tendered their payments
with the thought it was in full satisfaction of what was due,
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there is no finding that Potter accepted the payments in full
satisfaction nor any basis in the evidence to conclude that she
did so. On the contrary, the Dishingers and Potter had exchanged
letters indicating very different views of what constituted the
"then prevailing rental rate." Nothing suggests either side
thereafter acceded to the view of the other or that they reached
a compromise. On the contrary, within days of accepting the
Dishingers1 check, Potter sent the Dishingers a default notice
stating what she believed the shortfall to be. A couple of weeks
later, the Dishingers filed their declaratory judgment action
acknowledging there was a dispute between the parties and asking
the court to resolve it--not claiming there had been a dispute
between the parties that had been resolved by accord and
satisfaction and asking the court to enforce the accord.
%43 Applicable law does not require anything inconsistent with
the expectations of the parties, as shown by their conduct. The
"New Base Rent" notation, apparently made in the "For
"
space on the front of the check, clearly does not satisfy the
UCC's requirement that "the instrument or an accompanying
written
communication contain [] a conspicuous statement to the effect
that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the
claim." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-31M2) (1997) (emphasis added).
In addition, cases relied on by the majority are inapposite. In
both Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985), and
Cove View Excavating & Construction Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), unlike in this case, the checks evidencing
the accord and satisfaction contained actual restrictive
endorsement provisions. See Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 608
("Endorsement hereof constitutes full and final satisfaction of
any and all claims . . . . " ) ; Cove View, 758 P.2d at 476 (check
contained "pmt. in full" language on front of check and this
restrictive endorsement language on back of check: "payment in
full for all labor and materials to 6/26/84"). In Estate
Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), a detailed
letter made it clear that the check could be accepted only as
full payment. See id. at 324-25.
1J44 As a matter of law, the facts in this case do not establish
an accord and satisfaction. The jury recognized this and went on
to find that the prevailing rental rate was $25 per square foot
and that the Dishingers owed this to Potter under their contract.
Does this mean the Dishingers unlawfully detained the premises,
subjecting them to treble damages? It does not. Potter, in her
"notice to pay rent or quit," demanded payment of a sum well in
excess of what she was entitled to contractually. The jury found
the prevailing rate was $25, but she had demanded payment of $30.
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The invalid demand renders the notice completely ineffective to
place the Dishingers in a state of unlawful detainer.
1|45 When the dust settles in this case, the proper result
emerges with reasonable clarity. The Dishingers did not owe as
much as Potter thought they did, but they owed more than they
thought they did. There was no accord and satisfaction, so they
are liable for the shortage. On the other hand, Potter had no
right to demand payment of an amount to which she was not
entitled, so she may not have the lesser amount to which she was
actually entitled trebled, nor is she entitled to any other
relief specially available under the unlawful detainer statute.
Clearly, then, there is no prevailing party here--each side won a
little and lost a little--so neither side is entitled to an award
of attorney fees.
1|46 On remand, I would simply have the trial court amend its
judgment to reflect the foregoing.

Orme, Judge
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